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ABSTRACT. Elaborating on the notions that humans
possess different modalities of decision-making and that
these are often influenced by moral considerations, we
conducted an experimental investigation of the Trolley
Problem. We presented the participants with two stan-
dard scenarios (‘lever’ and ‘stranger’) either in the usual or
in reversed order. We observe that responses to the lever
scenario, which result from (moral) reasoning, are affected
by our manipulation; whereas responses to the stranger
scenario, triggered by moral emotions, are unaffected.
Furthermore, when asked to express general moral
opinions on the themes of the Trolley Problem, about
half of the participants reveal some inconsistency with the
responses they had previously given.
KEY WORDS: experiments, intuition, moral emotions,
moral judgement, moral reasoning, trolley problem
Roughly 30 years of studies of human behaviour and
cognition have taught us that decision-making is
‘‘intendedly rational, but only limitedly so’’ (Simon,
1961, p. xxiv) and that most behaviour is automatic
(Bargh and Chartrand, 1999), emotional (Damasio,
1999, 2000; Elster, 1999), instinctive (Camerer et al.,
2005; Rubinstein, 2007), or otherwise inspired by
some mental ‘short-cut’ or heuristic (Kahneman,
2003; Simon, 1955, 1978), and not carefully thought
over. Simplified procedures of these kinds are largely
successful, but occasionally they may fail in ways that
are both systematic and predictable (Gilovich et al.,
2002). In the last 15 years, we have also witnessed the
development of a conspicuous stream of research
investigating the role of mental short cuts (and
failures thereof) in moral judgements (Baron, 1994,
1995, 1997, 1998; Greene and Haidt, 2002; Haidt,
2007; Haidt and Joseph, 2004; Hauser, 2006; Messick
and Schell, 1992; Schelling, 1984; Sunstein, 2004).
Some psychological mechanisms, like emotions
and intuition, previously not incorporated in stan-
dard choice theory are instead central to our capacity
to cope with and thrive in a complex social and
natural environment, and they constitute a basis on
which an interdisciplinary approach to decision-
making could be fruitfully developed. We also
believe that, by means of such enrichments, eco-
nomic theory may aim at a deeper and more
nuanced understanding of individual behaviour in
the direction of increased realisticness, and that such
improved understanding requires, on some occa-
sions, to pay a more than cursory attention to the
role played by moral considerations.
In this article, we elaborate on such ideas by
addressing two modalities of ethical judgements –
moral emotions and moral reasoning – and how do
they affect decision-making. We do so with an
experimental investigation of the two standard
variants of a moral dilemma generally known as the
trolley problem.
The trolley problem
The moral philosopher Philippa Foot (1978) was
the first to suggest a challenging moral dilemma –
the so-called ‘trolley problem’ – in which a decider
is faced with two simple alternatives, both of which
result in tragedy. The scenario is roughly as follows:
a trolley is running down its track, but nobody is in
control. Along the track stand five people who are
unavoidably going to die unless the trajectory of the
trolley is altered. By flipping a switch it is possible to
lead the trolley to a different track, where unfortu-
nately a single person is standing and is then con-
demned to die. Though a case can be made for or
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against both hitting the lever and not hitting it, there
seems to be no obviously superior option to choose,
whence the dilemmatic dimension of the situation.
Nonetheless, most people agree that flipping the
switch is permissible.
When it is compared to an experiment with a
slightly changed setting, however, the case becomes
less straightforward (Thomson, 1976, 1985, 1986).
Suppose the same trolley is hurtling down towards
five people, but in the absence of sidetracks it is only
possible to block it by dropping a heavy weight in
front of it. There happens to be a stranger nearby
who is considerably overweight: enough for his mass
to be sufficient to halt the trolley, if he is pushed on
the track.1 In this case his life would be lost. Most
people, even those who tolerated the sacrifice of
one person to save five in the previous case, now
hesitate.
But why?
Either they are inconsistent, and thus their
seeming reliance on intuition proves faulty, or the
two situations differ in a morally relevant sense.2
One difference may be that killing the one is a
side-effect to the attempt to save the five in the first
case, while in the second case the killing of the
stranger is a crucial and deliberate step towards the
rescuing of the five. According to the ‘doctrine of
double effect’ (Aquinas, 13th century) the deliber-
ate causation of harm in order to promote some
other good is morally inferior to the promotion of
some good, whose indirect consequence is to cause
harm as a side-effect. This suggestion, however
disputable on different grounds (e.g. Kagan, 1989;
Unger, 1996), amounts to a trade-off between
good and bad deeds. What principle does guide
such trade-off?
Since it is impossible to save everybody, the
socially maximising conduct is whatever saves five
lives. Many philosophers believe this to be the cor-
rect source of moral decision-making; these are the
advocates of consequentialism, the ethical doctrine
that we ought to undertake whatever course of
action brings about the greatest benefit to the largest
number of people. Most subjects faced with the
trolley experiment, nonetheless, refuse to push the
overweight person and would feel uneasy if they
were told that such is the only moral choice in the
trolley problem. This might be taken as a prima
facie argument against consequentialism; or as
demonstration of our failure to apply that principle
under certain circumstances.
Following the lead of Immanuel Kant, the
adherents to deontic ethics believe instead that we
ought to act out of the principles of rational duty: to
behave, that is, in a way such that we would want
to become a Categorical Imperative for everyone to
follow. One such imperative is to never treat anyone
(including oneself) as a means, but always as a moral
end in himself. The stranger thrown on the tracks is
treated a mere means towards the goal of saving
someone else and this ought not to be done.
However, can we maintain that, in the original
scenario, the single person killed by our pulling of
the switch is taken as an end in himself?
We want to do good and save the five and we
certainly do not want the one to die, so even when
the ‘special disfavour of fortune’ or the ‘niggardly
provision of a step motherly nature’ prevent the
actualization of our intended achievements, our
good will, ‘‘like a jewel, would still shine by itself, as
something that has its full worth in itself’’ (Kant,
1784, p. 394). It follows that ‘‘people cannot be
morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for
what is due to factors beyond their control’’ (Nagel,
1993, p. 58). That there is a trolley running towards
five people is not our fault. We know, however, that
pulling the switch will kill someone, and operating
the switch is fully and exclusively under our control.
It is too fragile an argument to suggest that it is not
our fault that someone dies after we pull the switch.
Kant (1784, p. 394) specifies that chance does not
affect moral judgement only insofar as good will is
not mere wishing, but involves ‘‘the summoning of
all means insofar as they are in our control’’ (ibid.).
Moreover, we would not rationally want ‘pull the
switch’ to become an imperative rule followed by
everyone, lest we are prepared to accept our death to
be delivered when we least expect it through some
hurling trolley that a passer-by diverted towards us to
protect someone else. It is therefore not admissible,
for deontologists, to pull the switch.
Consequentialists would both pull the switch and
push the overweight person. Deontologists would
do neither. However, are common people either of
those?
Some of us, though perhaps a few, certainly are. It
is nonetheless clear to many commentators that
ethics should move beyond the logical derivation of
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what ought (not) to be done following from some
abstract principle and get a better grasp of the psy-
chological background of human decision-making
(e.g. Anscombe, 1958).
How do we make sense of the trolley problem?
The doctrine of double effect suggests that ‘pulling
the switch’ is admissible under some important
conditions. First of all, the real goal of one’s action
ought to be morally good. Second, the immoral
action ought not to be a goal in itself, but merely a
side-effect even if its undesirable consequences are
known in advance. Lastly, the immoral action ought
to be proportionate to the other immoral effects,
which would obtain in absence of the original good
action. The three conditions are met in the standard
version of the problem: pulling the switch aims at
saving five lives and it is a good deed, while the
death of someone else is unintended and propor-
tionate to the main goal. In the stranger variant,
however, the active pushing of someone on the
track reverses the situation: a morally bad action –
i.e. killing the overweight person – now brings
about the good side-effect of saving five people and
is not acceptable according to the requirements of
the doctrine of double effect.
The distinction between main aim and side-effect
in the trolley experiment cannot be easily conflated
with deontologism nor consequentialism, and cer-
tainly not in a way that is accessible to experimental
subjects innocent of moral training. They think it is
fine to let one die in the concrete attempt to save
five, conversely they would let die five people if
saving them requires that one be deliberately sacri-
ficed. They somehow reveal more tolerance of
omissions than actions though the consequences
might be ultimately worse. Perhaps, therefore, rather
than a fully worked-out normative ethical theory,
they follow some intuitive hunch. Edward Royzman
and Jonathan Baron (2002) indeed uncovered a
psychological mechanism in human judgement,
which they call ‘indirect harm bias’, favouring
indirectly harmful over directly harmful options
both in moral and non-moral issues, irrespective
of the associated outcomes, intentions, or self-
preservational concerns. In addition, results cannot
be fully explained in terms of differences in judge-
ments about which option is more active, more
intentional, more likely to cause harm, or more
subject to the disapproval of others. It is an intuitive
rule of thumb, which is consistently applied, but not
easily understood.
Moral intuition and the trolley
Some additional variants to the trolley problem were
proposed, in which the trolley in the initial situation
can be diverted to a track that loops back to the five
people, but a man on this track will actually stop it
and die, therefore becoming an active part of the
plan to save the five and no longer just a side-
casualty. In another version, the trolley can be
diverted by means of colliding another trolley into it;
both trolleys will then be derailed into the yard of a
sleeping man, who will thus be killed. On occasions
like these, the doctrine of double effect could pro-
vide specific guidance, but people do not seem to
follow its prescriptions. Instead, as the moral phi-
losopher Peter Unger (1996, p. 92) suggests, the
responses to the new problems are partly dependent
on whether the subject has already encountered the
standard version, because of a desire to express
consistent moral opinions. He also points out how,
by means of introducing intermediate alternatives to
<do nothing> and <kill one to save five>, the first
option may lose appeal and no longer be considered
morally superior to the last one. When intermediate
options progressively save more lives through
increasingly active forms of intervention, Unger’s
students conclude that <actively kill one to save
five> is better than <let one die to save two>, and
that <let one die to save two> is better than <do
nothing>, therefore, by extension <actively kill one
to save five> is considered transitively better than
<do nothing>. Rather than saying what they believe
to be the right thing, therefore, it seems that subjects
express what they believe is right thing, provided
that it confirms the rightness of whatever they had
said earlier on.3
Peter Singer (1999), whence the reflection and
the following quote are appropriated from, under-
lines how adding or deleting intermediate alterna-
tives affect our intuitive judgement of pre-existing
options, inducing test subjects to display what
behavioural economists term ‘preference reversal’.
However, at a closer look, it becomes apparent that
the intuitive reactions are based on rather odd factors
(Unger, 1996, p. 102):
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First, when serious loss will result, it’s harder to justify
moving a person to, or into, an object than it is to
move the object to, or into, the person. Second, when
serious loss will result, it’s harder to justify changing
the speed of a moving object, or changing its rate of
motion, than changing the object’s direction of
motion. Third, when there’ll be big loss, it’s harder to
justify speeding up an object than slowing down an
object. Fourth, it’s a lot harder to justify taking an
object at rest and setting it in motion than to justify
taking an object in motion and increasing its speed …
[Fifth] it’s harder to justify imposing a substantial force
on an object than it is to justify allowing a force already
present (just about) everywhere, like gravitation, to
work on the object.
Are these factors morally relevant? Are our intu-
itions granted? Perhaps, Singer suggests, these intu-
itions rely on some proxy of genuine moral factors,
but when relentlessly exported to alien contexts they
are no longer suitable. Thus, Unger concludes,
responses to the trolley problem are rather dependent
on psychology than on ethics proper.
Moral intuition and psychology
The mayhem of intuitive feelings is far reaching. If
intuition is such a biased process, one may believe it
would always be better to sit down and carefully
deliberate. Besides the inefficiency of such proposal
(because deliberation is very costly, both effort- and
time-wise), careful reasoning may even be ineffec-
tive. Even thorough analyses often rely on intuitive
hunches, and they may prove unable to reach a
satisfactory solution.
For one instance, in the 1970s British and
Japanese health authorities decided to suspend the
provision of DPT vaccines on the basis that they
could, as a side-effect, cause the death of a little
number of patients, smaller – it should be noted –
than the number of patients who would have died in
the absence of such vaccine. Similarly, polio vaccine
Sabin is more effective than Salk; yet, the first may
cause polio in patients. Despite this risk the number
of lives saved by Sabin remains significantly higher
than Salk. Many specialists, nonetheless, have pre-
ferred the less effective treatment on the grounds of
an intuitive judgement that procuring harm is worse
than not avoiding harm. Omissions are treated with
more indulgence than actions (another instantiation
of the ‘indirect harm bias;’ Royzman and Baron,
2002). The consequence is that a number of lives
was lost to this line of reasoning. This approach may
seem to be in contradiction with the doctrine of
double effect (in terms of proportionality), and
indeed the delivery of DPT vaccine has been
restored, just like Sabin is nowadays once again
preferred to Salk. The loss of lives to side-effects
(although known with fair statistical certainty) is
considered admissible in the attempt of saving a
greater number of lives. Cases like these may keep
someone struggling to find a solution, but not always
there is room for correction.
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1981)
administered an experiment to two groups of sub-
jects. The setting is a case of a disease expected to kill
600 people. The first group of subjects was faced with
alternatives A and B, the second group with C and D.
If program A is chosen, 200 people will be saved.
If program B is chosen, there is 1/3 probability of
saving 600 and 2/3 probability of not saving anyone.
If program C is chosen, 400 people will die.
If program D is chosen, there is 1/3 probability that
nobody dies and 2/3 that everybody dies.
This is a case involving human lives and the
attempt to save them, we certainly would not want it
to be deliberated upon by gut feelings. Since it is
evident that program A is identical to C and B to D,
we are confident that either A/C is better than B/D
or vice versa. Why then 72% of the first group
would choose A, while 78% of the second group
would choose D? Are such intuitions sound? This is
an instantiation of ‘framing’. Subjects do not ques-
tion the real effect of each policy, but take it at its
face value. In this case, it is normal to see the granted
safety of 200 people as a gain and the certain death of
400 as a loss. As Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also
pointed, we are more risk averse with respect to
gains than to losses. The words employed in setting
the problem to the two groups determine different
perceptions, so that in the first case subjects are
unwilling to promote the same risky program they
support in the second case. It is also noteworthy that
none of the responses seems to be particularly
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problematic and there seems to be a significant
confidence underlying the choice of plan A and plan
D. Intuition operates very fast, it is often uncon-
troversial, and it does not always render due justice
to subtle differences.
Moral heuristics
As we shall see in greater detail below, the responses
of the participants in our trolley problem experiment
do account for the distinctions in the two situations.
Given the time constraints imposed on the decision
and their lack of formal philosophical training,
however, it is rather implausible to imagine that our
subjects were rationally considering an actual appli-
cation of the doctrine of double effect (or any other
ethical doctrine). It is more likely that they were
employing some sort of heuristic following from that
principle or – which in the light of the previous
discussion seems more probable – that the doctrine
of double effect originates in some measure from
such rule of thumb.
Indeed moral judgement does not escape
automatic processes: we face situations and promptly
deliver a good/bad intuitive evaluation of alterna-
tives as part of our perceptions; explanation comes
only afterwards, if at all (Haidt, 2001). There is an
expanding body of experimental evidence showing
that people make choices for (at least in part)
unknown reasons, and then make up reasonable
justifications, while remaining unaware of the gap
between their real motivation and their ex-post
rationalisation (T. Wilson, 2002).
The immediate responses may be traced to moral
emotions as opposed to moral reasoning. Through
the analysis obtained with functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) from subjects involved
with both ethical problems of various kinds and
non-ethical ones, it can be observed that the brain
areas activated differ significantly (Greene et al.,
2001, pp. 2106–2107; see also Greene and Haidt
(2002) and Greene et al. (2004)). When facing
moral-personal decisions – i.e. something that is ‘up
close and personal’ in the fashion of the overweight
stranger scenario, or the pushing of someone off a
sinking lifeboat – those brain areas react (i.e. medial
prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus,
and superior temporal sulcus/tempoparietal junction)
that have been identified as correlates of emotional
arousal. The same areas remain inactive in moral-
impersonal decisions – i.e. something that is some-
how distant, like the lever scenario or a case of
keeping the money found in a lost wallet – and in
non-moral ones – e.g. a choice between different
means of transportation given some time constraint.
The areas of the brain associated with working
memory (i.e. middle frontal gyrus and parietal lobe)
instead were less active in the moral-personal sce-
narios, but became activated in both the moral-
impersonal and the non-moral decisions.
Also response times differ across scenarios. The
fastest responses were judgements of inappropriate-
ness to moral-personal decisions, signalling that they
are virtually automatic because they elicit ‘‘prepo-
tent, negative social-emotional responses’’ (Greene
et al., 2004, p. 390). The slowest responses, on the
other hand, were judgements of appropriateness to
the same decisions, signalling that the subjects had to
override the instinctive emotional response. Moral-
impersonal and non-moral decisions’ reaction times
were in between (Greene et al., 2001, p. 2107). All
these differences reflect on people’s responses and
can be responsible for seeming inconsistencies across
scenarios.
Looking at the problem from a different angle
may suggest that the questions and answers which
puzzle philosophers may not amount to inconsis-
tencies proper, but reflect real differences – perhaps
differences which are not easily accessible to arm-
chair philosophical speculation – in the perception
and processing of information concerning scenarios,
alternative conducts, and their moral significance. In
other words, we express a warning that the associ-
ation between the lever and the stranger variants of
the trolley problem may be somewhat artificial: the
two scenarios are cognitively and emotionally dis-
tinct and our brain treats them very differently
although both scenarios reproduce a choice context
in which a moral violation must be committed in
order to ensure the maximisation of aggregate wel-
fare. We may certainly imagine more cases, either
abstract as here or actual as they would be in a real
business decision, in which similar morally difficult
choices ought to be made and we would like to
bring our experimental results below to bear on the
issue at large. Yet, we may not be fully entitled to
directly comparing predominantly emotional and
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predominantly reasoned decision-making simply
because they could be constructed to apply to sce-
narios that resemble each other in any number of
respects.
Aside from this warning, we subscribe to the
notion that ‘‘moral thinking is driven largely by
social-emotional dispositions built on those we
inherited from our primate ancestors’’ (Greene and
Haidt, 2002, p. 519). For instance, in an evolutionary
perspective it makes sense to regard an emotional
aversion to damaging other humans as a fitness-
improving trait that confers upon its possessors some
advantage in grouping successfully (D. Wilson,
2002). Such ‘‘adaptation would have arisen at a time
when the scope of aggression was limited literally to a
stone’s throw’’ (Cohen, 2005, p. 12), while there was
no need to avoid harming other humans at long
distances, as this was not even, technologically
speaking, a possibility. Beside emotions, we are also
characterised by a capacity for elaborate abstract
reasoning. Human moral judgement may thus
be supposed to be ‘‘a complex interplay between
(at least) two distinct types of processes: domain
specific, social emotional responses and domain-
neutral reasoning processes applied in moral con-
texts’’ (Greene and Haidt, 2002, p. 519).
Moral emotions seem to import eminently in the
case of personal moral violations, while reasoning
applies to impersonal violations. Joshua Greene and
Jonathan Haidt (2002) characterise a personal vio-
lation as: physical harm to a specific person in such a
way that is not determined by a pre-existing con-
dition. Conversely, impersonal violations occur
when there is a mediating object between the agent
and his action, which on occasions seems to release
the agent from responsibility. We should thus expect
people to employ what Greene and Haidt call a
ME HURT YOU heuristic.4 Such heuristic may be
employed to quickly discriminate among situations
and viable conducts, and should result in refraining
from personal violations. For the sake of the trolley
problem, this amounts to pulling the switch and not
pushing the overweight stranger.5 This heuristic
resembles the doctrine of double effect.
Since moral characters and opinions can be
variegated, we also remind that the two leading
moral schools of thought would each suggest a dif-
ferent conduct in the trolley problem, and that each
may be translated into some heuristic as well
(Chelini et al., 2007). One heuristic could be la-
belled SAVE THE MOST: people who follow this
heuristic would push the stranger and pull the lever,
in order to save the highest number of people. The
prescriptions of this heuristic are in line with con-
sequentialism. Another heuristic could instead be
called DO NOT TOUCH. Participants who employ
this heuristic would refrain from both pulling the
lever and pushing the stranger. This heuristic is
similar to the prescriptions of Kantian ethics. The
latter two heuristics, therefore, may not so much
discriminate among types of situations, to which one
responds with certain behavioural scripts, but they
promote a stable principle of conduct from which
agents elaborate actions to be defined case by case.
Since choice situations are complex along a variety
of dimensions, heuristics may enable quick decision-
making either by suggesting when to act in some
way (ME HURT YOU) or to always act in certain
ways (SAVE THE MOST and DO NOT TOUCH).
We now turn to the experimental results, which
allow us to investigate which heuristics, if any,
participants employ. We also examine whether
question ordering has any effect on the heuristics
employed. Finally, we elicit the general moral
opinions of participants and compare these with
previous responses.
The trolley experiment
On the 9th and the 13th November 2006 we con-
ducted a series of experiments with a total of 62
undergraduate students of law at the University of
Eastern Piedmont in Alessandria (Italy). The students
were summoned for a class in the Seminar of
Political Economy, which is not compulsory in their
curriculum, and which grants them 3 credits (out of
a total of 180 credits over 3 years required for
graduation – i.e. 5% of the annual credit load),
provided that they attend a total of three experi-
ments and a concluding lecture. The credits consti-
tute the compensation for participants.6
Participants were informed that they had to
answer truthfully and fill in its entirety a question-
naire aimed at understanding their moral opinions,
which had been prepared in a way that there existed
no right or wrong answers. They knew the experi-
ment would last about twenty minutes, and they
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were guaranteed full anonymity. On both days,
roughly half of the participants took part in either of
two treatments: the one (Standard Treatment) fea-
tured the lever-pulling scenario first, followed by the
overweight stranger scenario; the other featured the
same scenarios in reversed order (Reversed Treat-
ment). At the end of each scenario, the participants
were required to answer several yes or no questions.
Scenario 1
(As in the previous scenario) A trolley without
passengers and without conductor is travelling at full
speed down a track. On the track there are five
people, who will surely be killed if the trolley keeps
riding on the actual path. There is also a side-track,
on which there is one person.
A passer-by could pull a lever next to the track,
and this way deviate the trolley onto the side-track.
The passer-by realises that, if he does not pull the
lever, the five people will be killed. If he pulls the
lever instead, the five people will be saved. The
passer-by is aware, however, that by pulling the lever
the person on the side-track will be killed.
[Question 1] Under these circumstances, is it
morally obligatory for the passer-by to pull the
lever?
[Question 2] Under these circumstances, is it
morally acceptable for the passer-by to pull the
lever?
[Question 3] If the passer-by does not pull the
lever, is he intentionally killing five people?
[Question 4] If the passer-by pulls the lever, is he
intentionally killing one person?
Scenario 2
(As in the previous scenario) A trolley without
passengers or conductor is travelling at full speed
down a track. On the track there are five people,
who will surely be killed if the trolley keeps riding
on the actual path. A passer-by stands next to the
track, and he could push a very fat stranger on the
trolley’s path, halting its ride.
The passer-by realises that, if he does not push the
stranger, the five people will be killed. If he pushes
the stranger instead, the five people will be saved.
The passer-by is aware, however, that by pushing
him, the stranger will be killed.
[Question 5] Under these circumstances, is it
morally obligatory for the passer-by to push the
stranger?
[Question 6] Under these circumstances, is it
morally acceptable for the passer-by to push the
stranger?
[Question 7] If the passer-by does not push the
stranger, is he intentionally killing five people?
[Question 8] If the passer-by pushes the stranger,
is he intentionally killing one person?
In the lights of the previous scenarios, our subjects
were also asked to answer four additional questions,
which we employed to check for consistency.
[Question 9] Is there a difference, in terms of
moral responsibility, between intentionally kill-
ing someone and letting someone die?
[Question 10] If you answered affirmatively, is
intentionally killing someone morally worse than
letting someone die?
[Question 11] Is there a difference, in terms of
legal responsibility, between intentionally killing
someone and letting someone die?
[Question 12] If you answered affirmatively, is
intentionally killing someone legally worse than
letting someone die?
Results and discussion
The overall results (Figure 1) are not very much
unanticipated. About 95% of the subjects say that
pushing the stranger is not a moral obligation, and 53%
say that it is morally unacceptable to do so. About 24%,
instead, believe that pulling the lever is morally com-
pelling, and 87% consider it at least morally acceptable.
About 85% in the lever-scenario and 90% in the
stranger-scenario believe that abstention from action
does not amount to intentional murdering the five
people on the track. By and large (90%), however, they
consider pushing the stranger as a deliberate murder; a
smaller proportion (42%) also say that pulling the lever
amounts to an intentional killing of one.
When we observe the responses of two Treatments
separately (Figures 2, 3) some interesting differences
Emotions, Reasoning, and the Trolley 795
can be pointed out. It is not easy to predict
whether altering the sequence in which partici-
pants encounter the scenarios affects their responses
and, if so, how.7 Indeed, when the lever scenario
is put second, fewer participants are willing to
operate on the switch than when it is put first,
but the responses to the stranger scenario remain
unaffected.
If some moral emotions are evolutionarily sound
and hard wired into our species, we should expect a
very large majority of people to follow them so that
we observe a pattern of dominant behaviour con-
sistent with the emotion, while perhaps there will be
a display of greater variety of moral outlooks as a
result of moral reasoning. We also expect hard-wired
moral-emotional behaviour to be more robust – that
is less sensitive to contingent variations in experi-
mental conditions – which can import on reasoning
instead. Subjects in both treatments, indeed, respond
similarly to the emotional stranger scenario.
Whereas in the Standard Treatment 34% of the
subjects see room for moral compulsion and 94% for
moral acceptability in pulling the lever, the figures
scale down to 11% and 78%, respectively, for the
Reversed Treatment. These differences are espe-
cially important because they show that there is no
straightforward way to behave in the lever scenario
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Figure 1. Responses, by scenario.
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are crucially affected by the scenario sequence. On
the other hand, the stranger scenario is over-
whelmingly considered as a situation in which
inaction is morally superior to action.
One major discrepancy of clear moral conse-
quence can be identified between the two scenarios
that accounts, at least in some measure, for these
observations. The personal moral violation (i.e.
pushing the stranger) is consistently considered
intentional by a larger percentage of participants than
the impersonal violation (i.e. pulling the lever).
However, a discrepancy can be spotted here, too. In
the Standard Treatment the percentage is lower than
in the Reversed Treatment. Subjects in both treat-
ments largely consider unintentional the death of
five by means of not pulling the lever (86% in the
Standard Treatment and 85% in the Reversed
Treatment), but the murdering of the person on the
side-track is considered intentional by 59% in the
Reversed Treatment and by just 29% in the Standard
Treatment. Our results, therefore, confirm that the
stranger and the lever scenarios are perceived dif-
ferently. They further show that the lever scenario
may be perceived in more than one ways, depending
for instance on whether the participants have already
encountered the stranger scenario, while the stranger
scenario is not thus affected by ordering.
The difference in the attributions of intentionality
can be regarded as a turning point. Perhaps the
emotional activation of the stranger scenario makes
participants more alert to personal moral violations.
It makes, as it were, the three features of personal
moral violations, thereby including intentionality,
more salient and thus more likely to be attributed.
Even if we allow for the possibility that such dif-
ference only emerges as an ex-post justification, it is
not immediately clear what else it would be an
ex-post justification for.
We now turn to a more fine-grained analysis of
heuristics at the individual level, by means of which
we may point out additional and more specific
differences.
Response heuristics
Since we don’t ask our subjects to act directly, nor to
state how they would act if they were involved with
the decision first hand, and because experimental
subjects usually suggest a third person to act more
frequently than they would, we cannot easily say
who is employing which heuristic – nor if anybody
is employing any heuristic at all. We can, however,
presume that some patterns of responses point
decidedly towards the belief in one rule. We thus
calculate the support for heuristics restrictively:
namely, we consider the set of responses that can
only result in an application of the heuristic at this
stage (Table I). The SAVE THE MOST heuristic thus
requires that a subject answers affirmatively to
question 1 and to question 5 (i.e. she affirms it is
morally obligatory to pull the lever and to push the
stranger). For the DO NOT TOUCH heuristic, we
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obligatory acceptable int. kill 5 int. kill 1
no yes
Figure 3. Responses, reversed treatment.
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question 6 (i.e. she states it is morally unacceptable
both to pull the lever and to push the stranger). We
consider as instances of the ME HURT YOU heuristic
those in which a subject answers yes to question 1
and no to question 6 (i.e. she declares that it is
morally obligatory to pull the lever but morally
unacceptable to push the stranger).
We also check for consistency, by means of the
answers given to questions 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10. For
instance, when a subject holds the SAVE THE MOST
heuristic, he should either believe that pushing the
stranger and pulling the lever do not amount to an
intentional murder (q3, q4, q7, q8); or, if he does
believe that the killing is intentional, he should at
least believe that the intentional killing of someone is
not morally worse than letting someone die (q9,
q10). Lacking these conditions amounts to some
kind of inconsistency. A similar consistency-check
was conducted on the other heuristics as well.
The first observation is that nobody restrictively
supports the SAVE THE MOST rule and, though there
are indications that some participants never approve
of altering the path of the trolley (DO NOT TOUCH),
most of them intervene selectively (ME HURT YOU).
However, these are not evenly distributed, and in
fact are strongly clustered between the two treat-
ments. The ME HURT YOU heuristic is more com-
mon in the Standard Treatment, with 7 instances.8
In the Reversed Treatment, on the other hand, there
is but one subject supporting the ME HURT YOU
heuristic, and four supporting the DO NOT TOUCH
heuristic.
We now allow for an extended definition of
heuristics, as the set of responses that are merely
compatible with an application of each heuristic
(Table II). For the extensive SAVE THE MOST heu-
ristic we require that a subject answers affirmatively
to question 2 and to question 6 (i.e. she affirms it is
morally acceptable to pull the lever and to push the
stranger). The extensive DO NOT TOUCH heuristic
requires that a subject answers no to question 1 and
question 5 (i.e. she states it is not morally compul-
sory to pull the lever nor to push the stranger).
Finally, we consider extensive ME HURT YOU
heuristics those in which a subject answers yes to
question 2 and no to question 5 (i.e. she declares that
it is morally acceptable to pull the lever and not
morally compulsory to push the stranger). This test is
much less demanding, because some responses are
obviously compatible with more than one heuristic,
and in fact a rather common pattern of responses
allows for both types of intervention – push the
stranger and pull the lever – but does not consider
either as obligatory, and is thus compatible with all
of the three heuristics under consideration.
While roughly 40% of the participants give answers
compatible with the SAVE THE MOST heuristic, we
again observe a difference between the treatments for
the other heuristics. The subjects in the Standard
Treatment are more inclined to allow the ME HURT
YOU heuristic (91%) than the DO NOT TOUCH one
(65%), but the results are twisted in the Reversed
Treatment, with 85% participants who seem accep-
tant of the DO NOT TOUCH heuristic and only 74%
who agree to the ME HURT YOU one. Even the ME
HURT YOU heuristic, therefore, which has been
proposed as a plausible account of how people face
moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem may not
be unavoidably the rule preferred by the most
participants (see also Chelini et al., 2007).
Moral opinions and consistency
If scenario ordering affects the responses in terms
of attributed intentionality and of required and
accepted conducts, does it also influence more
general moral and legal opinions?
TABLE I
Restrictive heuristics, by treatment
St Treat Rev Treat Total
SAVE THE MOST – – –
DO NOT TOUCH – 4 (15%) 4 (6%)
ME HURT YOU 7 (20%) 1 (3%) 8 (13%)
N 35 27 62
TABLE II
Extended heuristics, by treatment
St Treat Rev Treat Total
SAVE THE MOST 15 (43%) 11 (40%) 26 (42%)
DO NOT TOUCH 23 (65%) 23 (85%) 46 (74%)
ME HURT YOU 32 (91%) 20 (74%) 52 (84%)
N 35 27 62
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No, this does not seem to be the case. There is a
remarkable uniformity of responses to the questions
(9–12) we employed to verify consistency across and
within treatments (Figure 4).
Given the noticeable differences in the preceding
responses, such homogeneity of moral opinions is
quite unexpected. How does it come about?
Perhaps the earlier questions were formulated in
such a way that there were several different ways to
respond, even for participants who held a common
moral outlook. This would be the case if those
answers did not differ significantly – but they do
– therefore we do not find this explanation persua-
sive. It is also possible that the ordering effect plays
out in a morally meaningful way that is clear to our
students but eludes us, and we can only suspend our
judgement on this possibility. Finally, it has been
suggested, both in connection with individual pref-
erences in general (Licthenstein and Slovic, 2006)
and specifically with moral judgements (Haidt,
2001), that preferences and opinions are constructed
in the process of elicitation. This account seems to
suggest that, perhaps participants are quite clear
about their opinions, in an abstract sense, but when
it comes to a specific application, their responses
need not follow from those opinions and may
instead be intuitively uttered or otherwise altered by
emotional activation. Conversely, it may also mean
that participants elaborate their moral opinions in a
way that is at least in part disconnected from
previous responses.
Analysing response patterns at the individual level
(Table III), however, does not reveal major differ-
ences. In both treatments, about 55% affirm that
there exist both moral and legal differences between
killing someone and letting someone die, with the
former being worse (YES – YES – YES – YES), about
20% declare that the difference is only legal (NO –
YES – YES), and a further 15% suggest that the moral
difference does not make the intentional kill worse
than the alternative (YES – NO – ANY).
We do not know, however, whether the partic-
ipants in our experiment had developed their moral
and juridical opinions before answering questions
1–8. Perhaps the elicitation procedure is such that,
when asked questions 9–12, almost everyone
74,29% 74,07% 76,92% 80,00%
85,71% 88,89%
96,67% 91,67%













St. Tr. Rev. Tr. St. Tr. Rev. Tr. St. Tr. Rev. Tr. St. Tr. Rev. Tr.
Moral Difference (q9) Morally Worse (q10) Legal Difference (q11) Legally Worse (q12)
no yes
Figure 4. Opinions, by treatment.
TABLE III
Patterns of opinions, by treatment
Questions 9, 10, 11, 12 St Treat (%) Rev Treat (%)
YES – YES – YES – YES 54.29 55.56
YES – YES – YES – No – –
YES – YES – NO 2.86 3.70
YES – NO – YES – YES 11.43 3.70
YES – NO – YES – NO 2.86 7.41
YES – NO – NO 2.86 3.70
NO – YES – YES 17.14 22.22
NO – YES – NO – –
NO – NO 8.57 3.70
TOTAL 100.00 100.00
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constructs the same preferences. If such is the case,
however, the participants may now give answers that
contradict answers previously given to the two
scenarios.
And they do. Figure 5 reports the relative fre-
quencies of four response patterns in which incon-
sistencies were observed, as well as their weight on
the total number of observations.
How can one be inconsistent? First, we consider
inconsistent suggestions that not pulling the lever
and not pushing the stranger differ in terms of
intentionality. Either one is intentionally killing five
people when one does nothing or not. However, it
cannot be plausibly argued that the intentionality of
some deaths resulting from inaction depends on the
alternatives to inaction.9 We also count as inconsis-
tency any combination of responses implying that it
is ok to do something bad or that it is obligatory to
choose an option not different from the alternative.
For instance, for the YES – YES – ANY patterns, in
which intentionality makes a death morally worse,
we consider inconsistent the responses suggesting
that pulling the lever amounts to an intentional
murder and yet it is admissible, unless not pulling the
lever is also considered an intentional kill. For the
NO – ANY patterns, conversely, we define incon-
sistent any suggestion that an act is morally obliga-
tory. How could this be the case, if it does not differ
from abstention in a moral sense?
Opinions that there are moral and legal differ-
ences between intentionally killing someone and
unintentionally letting someone die, but which are
inconsistent with previous responses about what one
is allowed or obliged to do, account for almost 30%
of all the answers. About 10% of all answers are
inconsistent with the opinions that the difference is
only juridical and not moral. More generally, it is
remarkable that 45% of all subjects are inconsistent in
one way or another.
Concluding remarks
Should a carmaker introduce a safety system to
guarantee additional protection to pregnant ladies in
the passenger seat in the event of a side crash or
should it modify the windshield so that it better
protects both the driver and the passenger involved
in any accidents? In addition, should it recruit low-
income people to drive the cars into potentially
harmful, voluntary accidents in order to test its
innovations? Should the R&D department of a large
pharmaceutical company develop a new drug to
cure a relatively minor disease killing a few patients
every year and for which there exists no therapy, or
should it invest in a (or yet another) new drug to
reduce the risk of heart failure in a much larger
number of patients? Also, should it be entitled to
endangering some people’s or animals’ lives when
testing the new drug? In the presence of limited
resources and uncertain returns to investments these
are clearly financial/economic decisions. However,
they are quite obviously also moral ones. On the one
hand, they concern the allocation of scarce resources
towards competing ends with different social costs
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Figure 5. Inconsistent opinions, by treatment.
800 Alessandro Lanteri et al.
against each other and which may have differing
degrees of risk and uncertainty. On the other hand,
they concern the commission of a moral violation in
order to maximise aggregate welfare, and bear
consequences on questions such as whether know-
ingly letting the few die in the attempt to save the
many is morally admissible or whether deliberately
killing the few in order to save the many is accept-
able. In this article, we are concerned with the latter
kind only.
We elaborate on the notion that humans employ
different modalities of decision-making both along
the cognitive/affective and along the controlled/
automatic axes (Camerer et al., 2005). We also
believe that these are often influenced by moral
considerations, either in their emotional or reasoned
versions. Our experimental study of the trolley
problem allows us to explore some of the effects of
moral cognitions and emotions on decision making,
as well as some effects of their interplay. Specifically,
our results substantiate the main finding that previ-
ously aroused emotions affect moral reasoning, but
the vice versa does not hold. As in the real world
people cannot choose in what order they face (and
thus learn how to react to) ethically delicate situa-
tions, we believe it important to explore the scope
and relevance of moral heuristics in a broad sense.
What we consider as a common weakness in the
discussions of the trolley problem we came across in
the literature is their lacking of hard data. To be sure,
it is possible to speculate on alternative setups of the
dilemma in the fashion of a thought experiment, or
to gather circumstantial evidence in class and at
seminars. Yet, the systematic and rigorous testing on
substantial numbers of subjects allows much sounder
(and richer) analyses. By means of this article, we
also wish to contribute a set of observations that may
be taken as a reference for those interested in the
attempt.
The results of the trolley experiment presented
above are consistent with previous suggestions that,
when damage follows, indirect agency is often
considered admissible while direct agency is not
(Greene and Haidt, 2002). The data also confirm the
broad acceptance of the ME HURT YOU heuristic
and allows for alternative heuristics, which we
labelled SAVE THE MOST and DO NOT TOUCH. Our
goal, however, is not to proclaim any of these as
morally sound procedure, nor as desirable ones.
Indeed the experiment we discussed does not
make a compelling case for normativity: while many
subjects tolerate the pull the switch option, it is not
evident that they consider it a moral dogma. Con-
versely, virtually all participants do not consider
pushing the overweight stranger as a moral obliga-
tion, but quite a number consider it acceptable in
spite of the acknowledgement that it amounts to an
intentional murder (perhaps some of them believe it
admissible, under some circumstances, to deliber-
ately kill someone). Even if our results pointed more
evidently towards normative conclusions, we would
still feel entitled to questioning the ethical authority
of first year Law students. With due caveats of which
we are aware, we therefore propose this research as
an essay in positive cognitive-moral theory: our
results uncover some novel and interesting facts
about human decision-making in morally loaded
contexts.
Human capacity for moral conduct might stem
not so much from some reasoned principle, but from
our biological profile. Human criteria for moral
assessment might thus derive precisely from that
capacity, instead of from some higher value handed
down to lay people by means of moral theories. As
shown in many experimental researches (including
ours above), we are capable of quickly answering
moral questions although we might ignore exactly
why. Afterwards we can reason about the situation
and try to make up a story that justifies our intuitive
answer. Such justification, if successful, is likely to
become some sort of rule that we keep following,
reinforcing through time our conviction that we are
doing the right thing. The doctrine of double effect
might be interpreted like such justification. On the
other hand, the general moral opinions we entertain
may be inconsistent with our moral judgements and
the justifications we assemble for them, perhaps
because they, too, are intuitively generated.
Humans probably have a set of hard-wired moral
emotions immediately triggered by some features in
a choice situation – for instance, among others,
personal-moral features. These do not seem to be
susceptible to ordering effects. The more reflective
set of cognitive tools that we employ for impersonal-
moral (and non-moral) choices, on the other hand,
can be ‘disturbed’ by previously activated emotions.
Though this is the most plausible explanation we can
conjure to account for our data, at the present stage
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we can only advance it as a speculation and as a
proposal for further testing for our colleagues in the
neurosciences. We therefore wish to add to the
difficulty of answering the questions such as those
about the automobile and the pharmaceutical com-
panies by emphasising that the way in which ques-
tions are framed is likely to bear direct consequences
on the nature of answers. When arguing in favour or
against either response and before dismissing the
counterpart’s outlook on the matter, therefore, one
may want to stop and ponder about the modality
through which she has come to an answer.
Notes
1 The stranger ought to be described as significantly
overweight both in order to ensure the plausibility of the
scenario and to rule out (for most participants) the option
of jumping in front of the trolley, thereby sacrificing one-
self to save the five, but still sparing the stranger.
2 The problem of whether there exist moral differ-
ences between killing and letting die has long troubled
philosophers. We shall not enter the debate, but simply
present the issue in the lights of the major moral theories
before bringing psychological reflections that bear on the
matter. For comprehensive reviews and discussions, see
Norcross (2002) and Steinbock and Norcross (1994).
3 The experimental data we shall shortly present,
however, deny this remark in some ways.
4 ME amounts to the requirement that the action must
result from an agent’s conscious will, and not by acci-
dent; HURT concerns physical harm; and YOU identifies
a specific victim.
5 We observe in passing that, while it is understand-
able that one should not commit personal moral viola-
tions and thus not push the overweight stranger, it is
not very clear why one should commit impersonal
moral violations and pull the lever.
6 When they took part in the other experiments of
the Seminar, the participants were paid according to
their performance in specific tasks. An experiment based
on the trolley problem, in which there is no ‘correct’
answer nor there is a way in which one can compute
the collective outcome of individual decisions, cannot
be rewarded based on individual performance. Such a
reward might indeed backfire, because it would give
the subjects an incentive to ‘respond as they believe the
experimenters want them to respond’.
7 See, for instance, Unger (1996, p. 92). For more
formal studies on the influence of questions ordering on
participants’ response see Alspach and Bishop (1991),
Benton and Daly (1991), Crespi and Morris (1984),
McFarland (1981), and Willits and Ke (1995).
8 Two out of 7 ME HURT YOU restrictive-heuristics
are inconsistent because the subjects later claim that
there are no moral differences between intentionally
murdering someone and letting someone die, so that it
seems somewhat arbitrary to suggest it is morally com-
pulsory to pull the lever, but morally unacceptable to
push the stranger – the first not being an intentional
murder and the second being intentional.
9 Four participants in the Standard Treatment and 1 in
the Reversed Treatment show this inconsistency. These
inconsistencies are associated with at least another
inconsistency so that whether we count them or not
does not alter the data in Figure 5.
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